



The Character of the Business:  
Looking Through “Broken Windows” for Liability  
in Mass Shootings & Other Third-Party Criminal Acts 
Madison Shepley* 
“One unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one 
cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.” 
-James Q. Wilson1 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Cascade Mall 
On September 23, 2016, at 6:52 p.m., Arcan Cetin, armed with a 
.22-caliber Ruger rifle, walked through the doors of Macy’s women’s 
department store at Cascade Mall in Burlington, Washington.2 Within a 
few steps, he randomly opened fire, beginning with 16-year-old Sarai Lara 
who was standing by the clothing racks.3 The shooter, advancing further 
into the store, then shot Wilton “Chuck” Egan, who was attempting to run 
to his wife, before walking to the cosmetics counter and shooting Shayla 
Martin.4 Then, at close range, he shot Belinda Galde and her 95-year-old 
mother, Beatrice Dotson.5 The shooter placed the rifle on the top of the 
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cosmetics counter and left the store.6 Two minutes and fifty seconds—in 
that time, one man was able to casually walk into the store with a clearly 
visible semiautomatic weapon and murder five people in cold blood before 
casually leaving the building.7 By the time the authorities were first called 
at 6:58 p.m., he was long gone. He was not caught until the following night 
in Seattle, Washington—nearly twenty-four hours later.8 
Cascade Mall is an enclosed shopping center located in Burlington, 
Washington, which opened in 1990.9 From 1999 to 2017, Cascade Mall 
was owned by Macerich, a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) that is one 
of the largest owners and operators of shopping centers in the United 
States and is headquartered in Santa Monica, California.10 Following the 
shooting, in January 2017, the mall was sold to Merlone Geier Partners, a 
predominantly West Coast retail real estate investment firm based in 
Washington and California.11 Like most malls, Cascade Mall contains 
department stores, a food court, a movie theater, and kitschy cart vendors. 
However, unlike most malls owned in 2016 by companies such as 
Macerich and Merlone Geier Partners, Cascade Mall was quickly 
becoming a low-grossing relic of 1990s mall culture.12 Members of the 
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Burlington community described Cascade Mall as “creepy,” “like it’s been 
abandoned.”13 One stated that it “is a shadow of it’s [sic] glory days in the 
late 90s early 2000s. It once was th[e] focal point for every teen in the 
Skagit Valley. Now it’s just like some desolate catacombs . . . .”14 
Notably, even the community’s youth have taken notice of the mall’s 
ongoing declining state, reporting that “the mall seems like an empty 
wasteland soon to collapse on itself,” and have expressed concern that “it’s 
not a very secure place to settle.”15 These descriptions continue to remain 
true as of mid-2018—the mall houses numerous empty storefronts while 
Merlone Geier provides limited updated property leasing information or 
indication as to future opportunities at Cascade.16 
The state of Cascade Mall in 2016 is relevant for a crucial reason: it 
signaled vulnerability. The actual and perceived state of a community is a 
“window” into the safety of a community. Appearances of abandonment 
and neglect reflect breaks in those “windows,” exposing untended 
property and community breakdown. As a result, these broken windows 
are further indicators that community barriers and controls are lessened or 
“cracked”—thus presenting a vulnerable area to the opportunistic 
criminal. This was particularly, and tragically, true in the case of Cascade 
Mall. The vulnerable state of the mall is relevant because, on the evening 
of September 23, 2016, one man decided that this mall was a good target, 
or—at the very least—an easy target. 
The Cascade Mall shooting is particularly notable because it came in 
the wake of another Washington State shooting case that presented a 
crucial legal clarification of the state’s definition and potential 
interpretation of the “Prior Incidents Test”—McKown v. Simon Property 
Group, Inc.17 
B. Context Preceding the Shooting 
Under Washington law, to show that a landowner’s obligation to 
protect business invitees from third-party criminal conduct arises from 
past experience, the plaintiff must generally prove that a history of prior 
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similar incidents on the premises exists.18 In addition, if the criminal act 
injuring the plaintiff is not sufficiently similar in nature and location to 
prior acts of violence or not sufficiently close in time to those prior acts, 
or if the prior acts are not sufficiently numerous, then the third-party 
criminal act is likely unforeseeable as a matter of law.19 This current, very 
narrow, prior similar incidents test assures that businesses will be exposed 
to liability on this basis only when they have numerous past experiences 
of criminal conduct that make similar conduct on the premises foreseeable. 
Unfortunately, Washington State is no stranger to mass gun violence. 
On November 20, 2005, Dominick Maldonado walked into the Tacoma 
Mall, in Tacoma, Washington, concealing a MAK-90 rifle and an Intratec 
Tec-9 pistol and opened fire on shoppers and mall employees, ultimately 
injuring seven people.20 Brendan McKown, an employee at the mall, 
attempted to stop the shooter but was shot and wounded.21 Over a period 
of approximately eight minutes, Maldonado injured seven people, the last 
of whom was McKown.22 At the time of the shooting, there were four 
unarmed security guards on duty and no security cameras.23 The mall was 
equipped with an intercom system, but the system was inaudible and 
inaccessible on the weekends, and the security guards were never trained 
to use it.24 
McKown brought a negligence action against the owner of the mall, 
Simon Property Group, Inc. (Simon), alleging that Simon failed to exercise 
reasonable care to protect him from foreseeable criminal harm.25 Simon 
removed the case to federal court and successfully moved for summary 
judgment.26 In granting Simon’s motion, the district court applied a “prior 
similar acts” standard and found that there were no similar prior acts.27 
Although the court received evidence of six other shootings and three other 
gun-related incidents on the Tacoma Mall premises, it concluded that these 
other incidents were significantly different in “nature, scale, and location” 
from the mass shooting perpetrated by Maldonado.28 
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified several 
questions for the Washington Supreme Court, including (1) whether “prior 
similar acts” are a prerequisite to business owner liability for failure to 
prevent third-party criminal acts, and (2) if so, “how similar” must such 
prior acts be to the criminal conduct at issue in order to create a jury 
question on whether the criminal conduct was reasonably 
foreseeable?29 With respect to the first question, the Washington Supreme 
Court responded that “prior similar acts” are not the exclusive means of 
establishing a duty on the part of a business owner; a known threat of 
imminent harm could also suffice.30 As for the second question, the degree 
of similarity required in order to find a duty based on “prior similar acts,” 
the court stated, 
[I]f the criminal act that injures the plaintiff is not sufficiently similar 
in nature and location to the prior act(s) of violence, sufficiently close 
in time to the act in question, and sufficiently numerous, then the act 
is likely unforeseeable as a matter of law under the prior similar 
incidents test.31 
Thus, a business’s location in a high-crime area alone would be 
insufficient to impose a duty on the owner to protect patrons against 
violent crime perpetrated by third parties.32 
However, in its opinion, the Washington Supreme Court explicitly 
noted that it has not yet considered whether the character of a business 
could invoke such a duty.33 The court suggested that future cases may 
inquire as to the circumstances under which the “place or character” of a 
business can give rise to a duty to protect invitees against third-party 
criminal conduct.34 In McKown, Brendan McKown described the Tacoma 
Mall as a “soft target,”35 whose place or character made the harm 
reasonably foreseeable. Aside from that assertion, however, he offered no 
explanation as to how or why the “character” of the mall necessarily made 
the mass shooting in the case “reasonably foreseeable.”36 In order to 
explain what “character” truly refers to, the remainder of this Comment 
addresses and examines trends of analysis for foreseeability in order to 
discern whether “character of the business” may be incorporated 
expressly, implicitly, or theoretically. 
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If one considers the state of Cascade Mall as a relic of the 1990s, 
which was largely abandoned with increasingly empty storefronts, under 
a “broken windows” theory there is room for argument that the mall was 
particularly vulnerable to attack. Given its declining state, the 
vulnerability of Cascade Mall made criminal acts against a soft target 
reasonably foreseeable. Character of the business should be read and 
applied as an expansion of how Washington State courts treat 
foreseeability of third-party criminal acts and serve as a response to the 
current, very narrow, prior similar incidents test. Character of the business 
is an opening for a definition of what types of “states” or “characters” put 
businesses or other premises on notice that they may be liable for third-
party criminal acts. 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the various state 
analyses for determining liability for third-party criminal conduct. This 
section highlights conservative and liberal aspects of each approach with 
a particular critique of each approach’s utility in the prevention of third-
party criminal conduct. Part II provides a specific breakdown of how states 
have incorporated the concept of character of the business as a factor in 
liability analyses. This section outlines current competing definitions of 
character of the business and predicts a prevailing trend in interpretation. 
Part III(A) will provide commentary on potential interpretations of 
character of the business, which ought to be considered through the 
criminological perspective of the broken windows theory. This section 
also provides a comprehensive background of the broken windows theory 
itself, including its history and criticism. The broken windows theory 
provides a responsive framework to stave off future instances of third-
party criminal conduct. Part III(B) discusses the implementation of a 
broken windows interpretation of character of the business, along with 
some alternatives and additions geared exclusively to Washington, to be 
used to expand the current business owner liability for third-party criminal 
conduct in Washington. This framework will provide an expansive 
program that will be far more effective not only in combating mass gun 
violence but also in the overall prevention of felonies. The program 
promotes the safe practice of community monitoring and maintenance in 
order to prevent businesses from becoming increasingly vulnerable and 
susceptible to attacks. 
I. OVERVIEW OF STATE ANALYSES FOR THIRD-PARTY CRIMINAL 
CONDUCT LIABILITY 
Traditionally, courts have not held business owners liable for third-
party criminal acts because of the inherent unforeseeability of a random 
shooting or other acts of violence. In fact, many jurisdictions continue to 
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recognize the principle underscored in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
that a “possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his 
business purposes is not an insurer of the safety of such visitors against the 
acts of third persons . . . .”37 However, case law regarding third-party 
criminal liability is inconsistent across the state jurisdictions. As the law 
evolves, certain jurisdictions have carved narrow exceptions that 
recognize third-party criminal acts as foreseeable based on the application 
of a “prior similar incidents test” or a test that considers whether the 
business owner had notice of imminent harm.38 Yet, other jurisdictions are 
indicating a trend in the law that desires further expansion of the definition 
of foreseeability beyond merely the consideration of prior similar 
incidents by also applying a balancing or a totality of circumstances 
analysis.39 This section outlines several different analyses for determining 
liability for third-party criminal conduct particular to various states, 
describing the analyses from restrictive to expansive. 
A. The Specific Imminent Harm Test 
The specific imminent harm test is one of the most conservative 
forms of analysis. The test recognizes, beyond the general torts concept, 
that a person does not have a duty to warn or protect another from the 
criminal acts of a third person, particularly when the “third person 
commits acts of assaultive criminal behavior because such acts cannot 
reasonably be foreseen,” nor does it require that there must be “an 
imminent probability of injury” from a third-party criminal act in order to 
impose a duty to protect or warn.40 The following jurisdictions currently 
apply this test (in order of descending restrictiveness): Virginia, Michigan, 
and Arkansas. 
In particular, Virginia has expressed a reluctance to impose a duty to 
warn or protect invitees even where there are prior incidents of crime.41 
Instead, the court has recognized “imminent probability of harm,” as a 
“heightened degree of foreseeability that arises where the defendant 
‘knows that criminal assaults against persons are occurring, or are about 
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to occur, on the premises,’ based upon ‘notice of a specific danger just 
prior to the assault.’”42 
Analysis under the specific imminent harm test is highly fact-
specific, with the court frequently concluding that facts relied upon in 
particular cases fail to establish a duty to protect against third-party 
criminal acts.43 For instance, the court held that employee 
misrepresentations about the safety of an apartment complex—where in 
one year 656 crimes, including 113 against persons, had been reported—
failed to give rise to the duty to warn or protect from harm because these 
facts failed to establish “an imminent probability of injury to [the plaintiff] 
from a” criminal act of a third-party.44 Yet, five years later the court found 
that a criminal act was imminent where the employees of an innkeeper had 
contacted police ninety-six times to report criminal conduct including 
robberies, assaults, and shootings.45 However, in this case, police had 
specifically advised the innkeeper that “its guests were at a specific 
imminent risk for harm to their persons from uninvited persons coming 
into or upon its property.”46 
In Virginia, it appears that “in only rare circumstances has [the] 
[c]ourt determined that the duty to protect against harm from third-party 
criminal acts exists.”47 Notably, even in case of the Virginia Tech 
Massacre, the court found that there were insufficient facts to conclude 
that the duty to protect students against third-party criminal acts arose as 
a matter of law.48 
Like Virginia, Michigan has similarly refused to impose a broad 
definition of foreseeability for merchant liability for third-party crime. The 
Michigan Court of Appeals purports to ground such a refusal in public 
policy, holding that liability determination on the sole basis of “a 
foreseeability analysis is misbegotten,” and rationalizes that “because 
criminal activity is irrational and unpredictable, it is in this sense 
invariably foreseeable everywhere.”49 In this application, emphasis is not 
put on the person in control of the premises, but in the crime prevention 
“because he is best able to provide a place of safety.”50 Respective of these 
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realities, the court has described that “it is unjustifiable to make merchants, 
who not only have much less experience than the police in dealing with 
criminal activity but are also without a community deputation to do so, 
effectively vicariously liable for the criminal acts of third parties.”51 
Rather stringently, the court further explained that beyond reasonably 
aiding in police involvement, a merchant is under no obligation to provide 
security guards or otherwise resort to self-help in order to deter or quell 
such occurrences.52 As such, liability will likely only be found in 
circumstances where a specific situation occurred on the premises that 
would cause a reasonable person to recognize a risk of imminent harm to 
an identifiable invitee. The court expressly stated that “it is only a present 
situation on the premises, not any past incidents, that creates a duty to 
respond.”53 The court has found limited exception to the limited duty rule 
imposing liability, with the predominant circumstance being when a 
criminal perpetrator was an employee and the employer had notice of the 
employee’s propensity to commit the type of crime.54 
The specific harm test has also been implemented in a modified form. 
In Arkansas, a totality of the circumstances test was expressly disavowed 
in favor of a joint application of the specific harm test and the prior similar 
incidents test.55 The deciding case of Boren v. Worthen National Bank of 
Arkansas involved a gun attack against two female patrons at a drive-
through ATM, where the gunmen approached from hiding to fire into the 
vehicle of the victims and robbing them. In its consideration of the 
applicability of each test (totality of the circumstances, specific harm, or 
prior similar incidents), the court placed emphasis on specific business 
owner knowledge and awareness, to recognize that “the duty of a business 
owner to protect its patrons from criminal attacks,” exists “only where the 
owner or its agent was aware of the danger presented by a particular 
individual or failed to exercise proper care after an assault had 
commenced.”56 In Boren, the court conducted analysis under each of the 
tests, ultimately concluding that under the specific harm and prior similar 
incidents tests that “two incidents of robbery at Worthen ATMs in the 
nearly eight years prior to the attack on Boren [were] not sufficient to 
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impose a duty on Worthen to guard against the criminal acts of a third 
party.”57 
In contrast, the Boren court noted that it was only under a totality of 
circumstances test that the plaintiffs could have established a duty of care 
owed by Worthen. The court framed its analysis using “places or character 
of the business” language from the Restatement, and considered “the 
nature, condition, and location of the premises, in addition to any prior 
similar incidents, and a duty can be found where no prior criminal attacks 
have occurred.”58 Under this test, the plaintiffs would have been owed a 
duty under the rationale that all ATMs carry an inherent risk due to their 
purpose and location. 
Ultimately, the court used foreseeability and public policy to 
reconcile the difference in outcomes between the tests. “In all three tests, 
the foreseeability of the criminal act is a crucial element in determining 
whether a duty is owed.”59 However, the court found that adoption of a 
totality of the circumstances test would impose responsibility for violent, 
non-foreseeable, third-party criminal conduct onto businesses.60 In doing 
so, the court expressly laid out its priorities regarding community safety 
and responsibility in the final sentences of its opinion: 
We also cannot say that it would be appropriate as a matter of policy 
to impose a higher duty on business owners who are willing to 
provide their services in “high crime areas” or “near a housing 
project”—most commonly the areas in which low and moderate 
income residents are to be found.61 
Since Boren, one case has applied both specific harm and prior 
similar incidents tests; however, it remains unclear whether the joint 
application of these tests is conjunctive or disjunctive. In Willmon v. Wal-
Mart Stores, the court adopted a Boren framework, only to conclude that 
a customer’s abduction from a store parking lot and subsequent rape and 
murder were unforeseeable under both specific harm and prior similar 
incidents tests with no comment on future application or alternative modes 
of recovery.62 
However, despite the unclear application of the specific harm and the 
prior incidents test from Arkansas courts, what remains clear is their 
sentiment as to public policy. Since Willmon, Arkansas has not departed 
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from its characterization of a third-party claim as a “broad attempt to shift 
responsibility for police protection from the government to the private 
sector and as imposing limitless demands on business.”63 
B. The Prior Similar Incidents Test 
The prior similar incidents test recognizes that “[o]ne who controls 
the premises does have a duty to use ordinary care to protect invitees from 
criminal acts of third parties if he knows or has reason to know of an 
unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to the invitee.”64 Foreseeability 
is determined through evidence of “specific previous crimes on or near the 
premises.”65 There are a few states that generally adhere to this test: Texas, 
New York, and Washington. 
In Texas, unless the business owner has “direct knowledge that 
criminal conduct is imminent,” the court evaluates foreseeable criminal 
conduct by applying a five-factor analysis (the Timberwalk factors).66 The 
Timberwalk factors include (1) proximity of the crime to the business; (2) 
recency of the prior crimes; (3) frequency of the prior crimes; (4) similarity 
of the prior crimes; and (5) media coverage or other publicity of the prior 
crimes.67 Thus, a large number of prior crimes would result in a finding 
that the crime was foreseeable, whereas few prior crimes would not.68 
However, in Texas, there is at least one case that references “[t]he nature 
and character of the premises” in addition to prior similar incidents.69 In 
Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, the court found the Timberwalk factors 
were inapplicable and instead focused on “[t]he nature and character of the 
premises” as a factor making criminal activity more foreseeable.70 In Del 
Lago, a fight occurred in a bar at closing time following ninety minutes of 
heated altercations among intoxicated patrons.71 In its analysis of “nature 
and character of the premises,” the court recognized that intoxication is 
often associated with aggressive behavior and held that Del Lago had a 
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 65. Id. at 12. 
 66. See Timberwalk Apartments, Partners v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex. 1998); see also 
Del Lago Partners v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 767–68 (Tex. 2010). 
 67. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 759 (holding sexual assault was not foreseeable where there was 
only one sexual assault on the premises in the prior year and only six assault–type crimes in 
neighboring complexes—none of which were reported in the media or to the defendant). 
 68. Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Tex. 1999) (concluding 190 violent crimes 
in the vicinity is some evidence of foreseeability); Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32. 
 69. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 768 (holding risk of harm foreseeable in a bar even though there 
were few prior incidents involving criminal behavior because patrons were drunk and arguing for 
ninety minutes). 
 70. See id. at 767–68. 
 71. Id. 
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duty to protect if it had actual and direct knowledge that a violent brawl 
was imminent between drunk, belligerent patrons and if it had ample time 
and means to defuse the situation.72 Thus, the duty arose not because of 
prior similar criminal conduct but because the business owner was aware 
of an unreasonable risk of harm at the bar that very night.73 
New York conducts a similar factor-based analysis under the prior 
similar incidents test to determine whether there is a duty of care. The 
determination of foreseeability rests on the business owner’s knowledge 
of prior criminal activities on his or her premises and is determined based 
on the (1) location; (2) nature and extent of previous criminal activities; 
(3) their similarity; (4) proximity; or (5) other relationship to the crime in 
question.74 In addition, New York recognizes a “‘common-law duty to take 
minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable harm,’ including 
a third-party’s foreseeable criminal conduct.”75 
In premises security cases, “the question of what safety precautions 
may reasonably be required of the possessor of realty is generally a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury, taking into account such 
factors as, inter alia, the seriousness of the risk, the severity of 
potential injuries and the cost or burden imposed on the possessor by 
reason of each such precautionary measure. However, only those 
cases where there arises a real question as to the landowner’s 
negligence should the jury be permitted to proceed. In all others, 
where proof of any essential element falls short, the case should go 
no further.” In New York, a plaintiff’s own conduct “demonstrating 
a lack of reasonable regard for his own safety” can serve as an 
intervening cause absolving the defendant of liability.76 
The predominant criticism of the prior incidents test is that it too 
often results in conflicting determinations of foreseeability as a result of 
inconsistent application and analysis of several factors, including the 
requisite number of prior crimes, the similarity of the crimes, and the 
                                                     
 72. Id. at 769. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See generally Jacqueline S. ex rel. Ludovina S. v. City of New York, 614 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 
1993); Huyler v. Rose, 451 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Lauersdorf v. Supermarket Gen. 
Corp., 657 N.Y.S.2d 732 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
 75. Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (N.Y. 1998). 
 76. Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32. See also id.; Benitez v. Paxton Realty Corp., 637 
N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding that the plaintiff’s opening of door after dark without 
first checking the peephole to see who was at the door was an intervening cause of the criminal act); 
Elie v. Kraus, 631 N.Y.S.2d 16, 18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Ruggerio v. Bd. of Educ., 298 N.Y.S.2d 
149, 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (granting summary judgment for the defendants on the failure to 
supervise a claim because the plaintiff voluntarily engaged in a physical altercation that led to his 
injury). 
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temporal and geographic proximity of the prior crimes.77 Further criticism 
disavows the prior similar incidents rule, arguing that it is in contravention 
of public policy and notions of fundamental fairness through its near 
requirement that a crime occurs before preventative measures be taken. In 
a sense, the approach allows for one “get out of liability card” by allowing 
the first crime to occur; thus, removing any incentive to take preventative 
measures until and if that crime occurs and that victim is denied 
recovery.78 
C. Superior Knowledge Test 
A conservative enhancement to the traditional prior incidents test is 
the two-pronged superior knowledge approach.79 The superior knowledge 
test, with similarities to the imminent harm test, observes that business 
owners cannot protect people from random third-party acts of violence 
unless they are on notice of a special danger as a result of their unique 
position as an owner of the business.80 The superior knowledge test also 
incorporates the perspective and actual knowledge of the plaintiff as to 
whether he or she was aware of the risk of violence in a particular area 
before patronizing the business.81 
Georgia’s strict analysis requires that the plaintiff show not only that 
the proprietor had a duty to protect him on the basis of foreseeability, but 
also show that the existence of that duty depends on the superior or unique 
knowledge of the proprietor.82 It follows that in the absence of 
foreseeability, a proprietor would not have superior knowledge of the 
danger. However, under this stringent approach, even if the criminal act is 
foreseeable, it may not necessarily be the case that the proprietor has 
superior knowledge, and thus, it has no duty to protect invitees. 
Under Georgia’s analysis, determination of foreseeability reverts to 
a prior incidents test, which examines whether prior acts were substantially 
similar to the occurrence that caused harm by looking at factors including 
“the location, nature and extent of the prior criminal activities and their 
likeness, proximity or other relationship to the crime in question.”83 To 
                                                     
 77. Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 413–15 (Wyo. 1997). 
 78. Id. at 414; Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32. 
 79. Whitmore v. First Fed. Sav. Bank of Brunswick, 484 S.E.2d 708, 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that “[i]f a criminal act is not foreseeable, it logically follows that the proprietor does not 
have superior knowledge of the danger of its occurrence. But even if the criminal act is foreseeable, it 
does not necessarily follow that the proprietor has superior knowledge, since the danger may be 
equally apparent to the plaintiff.”). 
 80. See Wade v. Findlay Mgmt., Inc., 560 S.E.2d 283, 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). 
 81. Id. at 285. 
 82. See Whitmore, 484 S.E.2d at 711. See generally Days Inns of America v. Matt, 454 S.E.2d 
507 (Ga. 1995); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 405 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. 1991). 
 83. Vega v. La Movida, Inc., 670 S.E.2d 116, 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
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evaluate superior knowledge, courts examine (1) whether there is a history 
of substantially similar criminal acts at or near the same location readily 
known to the plaintiff or the public84 and (2) whether the business owner 
had unique knowledge that a specific third party with a history of violence 
will be present at the business.85 
D. Totality of Circumstances Test 
The vast majority of courts have abrogated a conservative analysis 
for determining liability in favor of a more liberal analysis: the totality of 
circumstances test. The following state courts have adopted the totality of 
the circumstances test: Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, Minnesota, Idaho, 
Nevada, South Dakota, Hawai’i, Florida, Indiana, Wyoming, Colorado, 
and Massachusetts.86 Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, duty 
is imposed “where circumstances exist from which the owner could 
reasonably foresee that its customers have a risk of peril above and beyond 
the ordinary and that appropriate security measures should be taken.”87 
In essence, the totality of circumstances rule is an expansion of the 
prior incidents test that considers not only prior similar incidents but other 
concomitant factors. The totality of circumstances test is more case-centric 
and requires a solid working knowledge of all of the attendant facts of the 
case at hand. However, in consideration of the circumstances of the 
particular case, there often must be a close connection or direct 
relationship between the harm sustained and the foreseeability of the 
conduct.88 Pertinent “circumstances” may include, but are not limited to, 
(1) the location of the crime and a review of prior criminal activity in the 
area; (2) the condition of the premises; (3) the design of the premises, 
including adequacy of lighting and architectural design; (4) the nature of 
the business and its hours of operation; (5) the extent and quality of 
security measures taken by the owner such as safes, guards, locks, alarms 
or surveillance; (6) the business owner’s knowledge of the intoxication or 
consistent use of alcohol and drugs on the premises; (7) prior warnings 
from law enforcement or employees regarding a threat on the premises; 
and (8) industry standards regarding security measures.89 
                                                     
 84. See Wade, 560 S.E.2d at 285. 
 85. See B-T Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 706 S.E.2d 87, 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); Norby v. Heritage 
Bank, 644 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Mason v. Chateau Cmtys., Inc., 633 S.E.2d 426, 432 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
 86. Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32. 
 87. Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Kan. 1993). 
 88. See Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 662 (Cal. 1985), holding modified by 
Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993); see also Seibert, 856 P.2d at 1339. 
 89. See generally Axelrod v. Cinemark Holdings, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1093 (D. Colo. 2014); 
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For example, consider a parking lot located in a high crime area; 
under a totality of the circumstances, the factor of location will be 
considered. The rationale is embodied in the public policy that “one should 
not be able to open an all-night, poorly lit parking lot in a dangerous high 
crime area of an inner city with no security and have no legal foreseeability 
until after a substantial number of one’s own patrons have fallen victim to 
violent crimes,” as under such circumstances, criminal activity is “not only 
foreseeable but virtually inevitable.”90 
In addition, in jurisdictions that apply the totality of circumstances 
test, it may also be necessary to determine state statutory requirements or 
limitations on liability specific to the type of business. For example, 
consider Florida Statute § 768.0705, which creates a statutory presumption 
against liability for the criminal acts of a third person if the owner or 
operator of a convenience business substantially implements the certain 
security measures.91 Likewise, under the Nevada Revised Statute § 
651.020, innkeepers and bar owners who have fulfilled a duty to eject 
patrons reasonably are protected.92 
Not unsurprisingly, the prevailing critique of the totality of the 
circumstances tests centers on the heavy burden placed on business owners 
to foresee the risk of criminal attacks on their property, and it criticizes the 
imposition of “an unqualified duty to protect customers in areas 
experiencing any significant level of criminal activity.”93 Still, other critics 
feel that the test invades the province of the jury as the fact-finder by 
attempting to determine foreseeability from all the facts 
and circumstances and erroneously equating the foreseeability of a 
specific act with previous occurrences of such an act.94 As noted, the 
general principle that a business owner is not an insurer of the premises 
exists across jurisdictions. With that in mind, critics argue that in the face 
of increasingly frequent random mass shootings, no amount of security 
measures can protect against random acts of violence.95 Imputing such a 
                                                     
Cause of Action Against Landlord for Failure to Protect Tenants Against Criminal Acts, in CAUSES 
OF ACTION SECOND SERIES, 34 COA2d 105 (2019); Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32; Uri 
Kaufman, When Crime Pays: Business Landlords’ Duty to Protect Customers from Criminal Acts 
Committed on the Premises, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 89, 96–97 (1990). 
 90. Seibert, 856 P.2d at 1339. 
 91. FLA. STAT. § 768.0705 (West 2018). 
 92. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.020 (West 2017); Rodriguez v. Primadonna Co., 216 P.3d 793, 
798 (Nev. 2009) (holding that commercial liquor vendors, including hotel proprietors, cannot be held 
liable for damages related to any injuries caused by the intoxicated patron to third parties under certain 
circumstances). 
 93. Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, 752 So. 2d 762, 767 (La. 1999). 
 94. JOHN ELLIOT LEIGHTON, LITIGATING PREMISES SECURITY CASES § 2:10, Westlaw (database 
updated Nov. 2018). 
 95. Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32. 
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duty to prevent random violent crime would place a significant economic 
burden on business owners.96 
E. Other Tests 
The balancing test is one of the more modern approaches 
implemented to date.97 Under this test, business owners assume the duty 
to protect if the foreseeability and gravity of the harm outweigh the burden 
to protect their invitees—thus, a balancing test.98 California was the first 
state to implement this approach, recognizing in a series of seminal 
opinions that: 
In cases where the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high 
degree of foreseeability may be required. On the other hand, in cases 
where there are strong policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the 
harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of 
foreseeability may be required.99 
Further, “duty in such circumstances is determined by a balancing of 
‘foreseeability’ of the criminal acts against the ‘burdensomeness, 
vagueness, and efficacy’ of the proposed security measures.”100 
For instance, in the case of Ann M., the plaintiff had been raped at 
the photo store where she worked, and she sued the shopping plaza in 
which the store was located, claiming there was a duty to hire security 
guards to protect against such crimes.101 In its analysis, the court balanced 
the foreseeability of the criminal act against the burden, vagueness, and 
efficacy of the proposed security precaution.102 While some evidence of 
prior crimes in the shopping plaza existed—including bank robberies, 
purse snatchings, and a man pulling down a woman’s pants—there was no 
evidence rising to the severity of rape.103 In that case, the court found that 
the burden of hiring security guards was so high that the requisite 
foreseeability to trigger the burden could rarely, if ever, be proven without 
prior similar incidents.104 Interestingly, it appears that California courts 
engage a heightened standard of care in determining whether business 
owners have a duty to employ security personnel, as evidenced by their 
                                                     
 96. Id. 
 97. California was the first state to implement this test in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping 
Center, 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993). 
 98. See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993). 
 99. Id. at 215; Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658 (Cal. 1985). 
 100. Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215; Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs., Inc., 88 P.3d 517, 522–23 
(Cal. 2004). 
 101. Ann M., 863 P.2d at 210–211. 
 102. Id. at 215. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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reluctance to impose a duty in the absence of prior similar incidents in that 
location. 
In addition to California, Louisiana and Tennessee have also adopted 
the balancing test. In an analysis identical to California’s, Louisiana 
weighs the foreseeability of the risk of crime on the business owner’s 
property and the gravity of the risk to determine the existence and the 
extent of the defendant’s duty.105 The court has expressly indicated that 
determinations must “make a policy decision in light of the unique facts 
and circumstances presented.”106 Louisiana courts consider various 
moral, social, and economic factors, including the fairness of 
imposing liability; the economic impact on the defendant and on 
similarly situated parties; the need for an incentive to prevent future 
harm; the nature of defendant’s activity; the potential for an 
unmanageable flow of litigation; the historical development of 
precedent; and the direction in which society and its institutions are 
evolving. 107 
Additionally, the Louisiana courts have explained that with respect 
to security measures, while a lower degree of foreseeability may impose a 
duty to implement security measures such as use and installation of 
security cameras or improved lighting, a very high degree of foreseeability 
is required to give rise to a duty to post security guards.108 
In its implementation of the balancing test, Tennessee also observes 
that risks are unreasonable and give rise to a duty to act with due care, if 
the probability of foreseeability and the gravity of harm posed by the 
defendant’s conduct outweigh the burden upon defendant to engage in 
alternative conduct that would have prevented the harm.109 In its analysis, 
the courts have considered several non-exclusive factors in determining 
the reasonableness of the risk, including: 
[1] the foreseeable probability of the harm or injury occurring; [2] the 
possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury; [3] the importance 
or social value of the activity engaged in by defendant; [4] the 
usefulness of the conduct to defendant; [5] the feasibility of 
alternative, safer conduct and the relative costs and burdens 
                                                     
 105. Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 766 (La. 1999). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Pinsonneault v. Merchs. & Farmers Bank & Tr. Co., 816 So. 2d 270, 276 (La. 2002); 
Posecai, 752 So. 2d at 768. 
 109. McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995); McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. 
P’ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 901 (Tenn. 1996). 
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associated with that conduct; [6] the relative usefulness of the safer 
conduct; and [7] the relative safety of alternative conduct.110 
Overall, the balancing test acknowledges that duty is a flexible 
concept and so seeks to balance the degree of foreseeability of harm 
against the burden of the duty to be imposed.111 Moreover, the approach 
recognizes that the presence or absence of prior similar incidents of crime 
is an important factor in determining the degree of 
foreseeability.112 Essentially, the flexibility of the balancing approach 
remedies the strictness of the prior similar incidents rules, thus avoiding 
“the pitfalls of that rule while solving the problems of [the] more liberal 
totality of the circumstances approach.”113 
II. CHARACTER OF THE BUSINESS AS A FACTOR IN LIABILITY ANALYSIS 
Character of the business as a factor in liability analysis is 
predominantly engaged through a totality of the circumstances approach. 
Character of the business originates from Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 344. Comment f to § 344 provides that “[if] the place or character of [a 
business owner’s] business, or his past experience, is such that he should 
reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third 
persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a 
duty to take precautions against it.”114 This Comment underscores 
certain factors to be considered under Restatement § 344, including the 
nature of the business location, the character of the business, and past 
crimes in the area.115 Liability of a business for the criminal acts of third 
persons is based on whether that business had reason to know, from past 
experience or from the character of the business, that there was a 
likelihood of danger to the safety of any visitor.116 “Character,” in this 
regard, has survived multiple interpretations, including the nature, 
condition, and location of the premises, in addition to whether any prior 
similar incidents occurred on the premises, and a duty can be found where 
no prior criminal attacks have occurred.117 
                                                     
 110. McClung, 937 S.W.2d at 901. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.; Donna Lee Welch, Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center: The California Supreme 
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In recent years, an increasing number of courts across state 
jurisdictions have incorporated character of the business into their 
analysis. To date, at least California, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, 
Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin have incorporated this factor. In 
Wisconsin, courts have repeatedly held that in amusement facilities, 
taverns, and businesses where a crowd or a large number of people 
assemble on a business owner’s property for purposes of financial gain, a 
business owner assumes an ordinary duty of care to protect the individuals 
from reasonably foreseeable injury.118 For instance, when a patron of a bar 
exited following expulsion of several unruly customers and sustained a 
head injury as a result of an ensuing assault, the court noted a tavern owner 
owes a duty to patrons “because the owner has superior knowledge of 
dangers that the place and character of the . . . [tavern] may pose.”119 
In Illinois, a court likewise looked to character of the business in its 
determination that a restaurant owed a duty to aid or protect customers 
against the unreasonable risk of physical harm posed by negligent acts of 
third persons after a vehicle crashed through a wall of a restaurant and 
struck and killed a patron.120 In its analysis, the court looked to the 
restaurant’s location, various aspects of its design, and evidence of an 
absence of safety precautions to prevent out of control vehicles from 
entering the restaurant.121 
New Jersey has also repeatedly used character of the business in 
applying a totality of the circumstances analysis. While typically a prior 
similar incidents test would reject evidence of substantial thefts as putting 
a business owner on notice for kidnapping and murder, in Clohesy v. Food 
Circus Supermarkets, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the 
kidnapping and murder of a supermarket customer from a parking lot were 
sufficiently foreseeable. Looking at the nature of the offense and specific 
characteristics of the location (a parking lot), the court held that 
(1) theft offenses frequently escalate into more violent crimes, (2) the 
crime rate in the defendant’s area had increased substantially in the 
                                                     
(noting that the character of some business establishments open to the public, such as a parking garage 
or an all-night convenience store, creates an especial temptation and opportunity for criminal 
misconduct that helps give rise to, and affects the scope of, the duty to protect). 
 118. See Alonge v. Rodriquez, 279 N.W.2d 207, 211 (Wis. 1979); Flynn v. Audra’s Corp., 796 
N.W.2d 230, 233 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011). See generally Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 48 
N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1951); Emerson v. Riverview Rink & Ballroom, 290 N.W. 129 (Wis. 1940). 
 119. Flynn, 796 N.W.2d at 233. 
 120. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1062 (Ill. 2006). 
 121. Id. (finding that location in an area with a “high traffic count” and design aspects, including 
its “brick half wall” and sidewalk, rendered the restaurant susceptible to penetration by out-of-control 
automobiles; that defendants took no precautions, such as installing “vertical concrete pillars or poles,” 
to prevent automobiles from entering the restaurant; and that defendants had knowledge of all of the 
foregoing gave rise to a duty to protect). 
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previous two years, and (3) recent crime statistics indicated that 
approximately 757,000 violent crimes such as rape, robbery, and 
assaults occurred in parking lots located throughout the nation.122 
While the court was cognizant of the potential impact its decision 
may have had on the question of duty owed to customers by small business 
owners near large businesses such as malls, it reasoned that risk 
determination was a case-by-case analysis.123 Thus, the decision 
represented not a major change in the law, but rather a definitive “nudge” 
forward. 124 
Similarly, Oregon recently clarified what characteristics give rise to 
a reasonable inference that a “place or character” imputes liability onto a 
business owner for third-party criminal acts. The court expressly 
articulated that “specific factual support—as opposed to relying on 
generalized abstractions about the existence of criminal activity” or a 
theoretical possibility that such a harm might occur was required in order 
to impute liability.125 
In sum, when employing a character of the business test in a totality 
of the circumstances analysis, courts tend to focus on whether the place 
and character of a location or business “invited” the criminal behavior or 
if the defendant’s business, by its nature, made it particularly attractive 
to crime, thus imposing a duty to protect customers. Jurisdictions across 
the country have found that bars, amusement parks, and other large 
gathering businesses owe an ordinary duty of care to their patrons.126 In 
analyzing character of the business, some jurisdictions go further still by 
looking to the precise location of the business and security 
implementations in an attempt to prevent an “open all-night, poorly lit 
parking lot in a dangerous high crime area of an inner city with no 
                                                     
 122. Peguero v. Tau Kappa Epsilon Local Chapter, 106 A.3d 565, 574 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
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security” with no legal foreseeability until after a substantial number of 
one’s own patrons have fallen victim to violent crimes.127 
The majority of criticism befalling character of the business argues 
that the approach paints foreseeability in broad strokes. Critics find that 
with the standard comes a risk of restricting certain businesses and 
imposing significant burdens on the owners of those businesses as a result. 
This is particularly evident in the context of banks. For example, the 
Oregon Court of Appeals in Torres v. United States National Bank held 
that a customer injured in a holdup did not need to allege previous assaults 
or robberies at the particular bank night depository.128 Rather, they 
explained that generalized evidence would suffice to establish a duty on 
the part of the bank, “including evidence of similar incidents at other local 
night depositories, the effect of an obscured location on the chance of a 
robbery, or any other circumstances tending to show the risk inherent in 
an invitation to do banking business after regular hours.”129 The court’s 
utilization of a multi-factor approach that considered the purpose or 
“status” of the business in determining customer safety and business 
liability, in essence, applied a duty of reasonable care under the 
circumstances considering the purpose or character of a bank and nature 
of the bank–patron relationship.130 
Inherent in this criticism is an acknowledgment that “place and 
character of the business” and “nature of the business” are subject to 
varying and wide interpretation. The application from the jurisdictions 
remains unclear. While some jurisdictions look narrowly to the actual 
purpose of the business, others look to the disposition and conditions 
surrounding the business. What is clear, however, is that character of the 
business remains not a dispositive indicator of liability but a mere factor. 
With a new jurisdiction prime to interpret just what character of the 
business means,131 we must inquire about the role of public policy behind 
this factor and in the liability analysis of third-party criminal acts as a 
whole. In jurisdictions employing more liberal approaches, such as totality 
of the circumstances and the balancing test, public policy prefers crime 
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prevention. However, in jurisdictions employing a more conservative 
analysis, such as specific imminent harm, superior knowledge, or prior 
incidents tests, public policy prefers lessened economic burdens on 
business owners. In a climate where third-party violence, and in particular, 
mass shooting violence, continues to increase, Washington is in a 
pioneering position to move towards maximizing safety and compensation 
to injured parties and away from conventional notions of fault 
determinations. By interpreting character of the business broadly to 
consider the disposition of the surrounding conditions of a business, 
Washington has the chance to promote social welfare by enhancing safety 
and ensuring compensation to those harmed in the course of third-party 
violence. 
III. COMMENTARY ON POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE AND THE BROKEN WINDOWS THEORY 
Character of the business has been repeatedly interpreted in several 
jurisdictions as broadly evaluative of the nature and surrounding 
conditions of a business.132 Encompassed in this interpretation are 
considerations of what should be seemingly obvious factors, which are too 
often dismissed under the other conservative liability analyses. The factors 
include (1) crime rate in the precise area, including petty and other non-
violent property crime; (2) apparent security measures; (3) vulnerability 
as a large patron gathering space; and (4) overall appearance of the 
premises. To further stress the necessity of such considerations, the 
following section reviews the criminological theory of broken windows, 
providing a sociological basis for focus on larger crime rates, apparent 
security measures, and disorder as a way to not only quell the commission 
of third-party criminal violence, but also to hold businesses liable when it 
does occur. 
This framework will provide an expansive program that will be far 
more effective in combating not only mass gun violence but the overall 
prevention of felonies. The program promotes the safe practice of 
community monitoring and maintenance in order to prevent businesses 
from becoming increasingly vulnerable and susceptible to attack. If 
implemented, the resulting broad interpretation of character of the 
business could encourage the maintenance and security of businesses, such 
as Cascade Mall, so that they are no longer predatory areas but protected 
ones. 
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A. Broken Windows: The Theory 
In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling introduced the 
broken windows theory into the lexicon in an article in The Atlantic 
Monthly.133 Based on a 1969 field study conducted by Phillip Zimbardo, a 
Stanford psychologist, the broken windows theory is 
a criminological theory that focuses on the effects of sociological 
concepts—norm-setting and signaling of urban disorder, disturbance, 
and vandalism—on more serious crimes and anti-social behavior.134 In his 
study, Zimbardo abandoned two comparable cars, each without license 
plates and parked with their hoods up, one on the street in Bronx, New 
York and the other on a street in Palo Alto, California.135 Remarkably, 
within ten minutes of “abandonment,” the vehicle in the Bronx was 
attacked by “vandals” who removed the radiator and battery.136 Within 
twenty-four hours, everything of value had been removed: windows were 
smashed, parts torn off, upholstery ripped, and children began to use the 
car for a playground.137 At the same time, in Palo Alto, the vehicle 
remained untouched for over a week.138 Then Zimbardo did something 
unusual and unconventional—he smashed part of the Palo Alto car with a 
sledgehammer.139 Within a few short hours, passersby had joined in the 
destruction, and the car was utterly destroyed—just as the car in the Bronx 
had been.140 
This field study demonstrated—very simply—how neglect, 
abandonment, and the appearance of disorder can make something quickly 
become a vulnerable target for criminals. In the article, Kelling and Wilson 
synthesized that a broken window or other visible signs of disorder or 
decay, such as loitering, graffiti, prostitution, or drug use, can send the 
signal that a neighborhood is uncared for.141 A brief summary of the theory 
comes from the following passage: 
We suggest that “untended” behavior also leads to the breakdown of 
community controls. A stable neighborhood of families who care for 
their homes, mind each other’s children, and confidently frown on 
unwanted intruders can change, in a few years or even a few months, 
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to an inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of property is 
abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop 
scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more 
rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers 
gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; 
they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in 
front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and 
is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by 
panhandlers.142 
According to the theory, maintaining and monitoring urban 
environments would aid in the prevention of small crimes such 
as vandalism, public drinking, and crimes against property by fostering an 
appearance of law and order, thereby preventing more serious crimes from 
happening. “The idea [is] that once disorder begins, it doesn’t matter what 
the neighborhood is, things can begin to get out of control.”143 In the Palo 
Alto study, it took just one hit from a sledgehammer to the vehicle to 
attract disorder. If one sledgehammer hit can cause an empty car to be 
completely destroyed by vandals and mere passersby, it is concerning to 
think what years of depreciation and neglect could cause to a business. 
Kelling and Wilson proposed that police departments change their 
focus. Officers should try to clean up the streets and maintain order rather 
than channeling most resources into solving major crimes.144 “Untended 
property becomes fair game” and the mere opportunity of disorder invites 
people to participate who may not have otherwise considered it.145 Thus, 
neglect and abandonment demonstrate a lack of care that in turn fosters an 
atmosphere of increased abandonment by community members out of fear 
for safety. It is these areas that are particularly vulnerable to criminal 
activity.146 Overall, Kelling and Wilson’s broken windows model focuses 
on the role that disorder and appearance of disorder play in generating and 
sustaining more serious crime.147 Disorder is not directly linked to serious 
crime; rather, disorder leads to increased fear and withdrawal from 
residents, which then allows more serious crime to move in because of 
decreased levels of informal social control and increased vulnerability of 
those locations as a target. 
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B. “Broken Windows” Application and Implementation 
In its initial recommendation and acceptance, the broken windows 
theory was wholly targeted at policing and the traditional role that the 
police force plays in crime control and crime prevention. As a result of the 
broken windows theory, police were encouraged to focus their efforts on 
less serious crime in neighborhoods that had not yet been overtaken by 
serious crime.148 Targeting efforts in this way has the effect of reducing 
resident fear and withdrawal.149 
Washington State has an opportunity to broadly define character of 
the business as expressly noted by the court in McKown v. Simon 
Properties. However, at its current progression, the case law suggests that 
Washington is gravitating from a prior incidents test toward a specific 
harm test. This is in large part suggested through Washington’s express 
rejection of the concept that a business owner owes a duty to invitees 
merely because the business is located in a high crime area: “if the 
premises are located in an area where criminal assaults often occur, 
imposition of a duty could result in the departure of the businesses from 
urban core areas—an undesirable result.”150 Furthermore, the Washington 
Supreme Court applies an enhanced prior incidents analysis, which 
requires that a criminal act must be “sufficiently similar in nature and 
location to the prior acts of violence, sufficiently close in time to the act in 
question, and sufficiently numerous” for the act to be considered 
foreseeable.151  
 Particularly in the wake of multiple incidents of mass gun 
violence, both within the state of Washington and the United States, the 
focus must return to maximizing safety and compensating injured parties 
and away from narrowly imposing liability out of concern for economic 
burden. Washington has the opportunity to offset the stringency of its 
current prior incidents test by interpreting character of the business to 
include surrounding conditions—including petty crime rate, apparent 
security, and disposition of the business—in determining foreseeability. 
Incorporation of such an interpretation is not only supported by the case 
law of fellow states but grounded through the thesis of the criminological 
broken windows theory. By taking into account petty crime rate, apparent 
security measures, and disposition of the business, the courts could engage 
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in crime prevention by holding businesses liable for third-party criminal 
attacks when they fail to keep their premises safe with adequate security 
and permit a disorderly condition. 
Especially with respect to malls, movie theaters, and schools—or any 
place where a large gathering of persons occurs—there should be a 
standard of foreseeability that reflects the vulnerability of such businesses. 
The introduction of this Comment began with the case of Cascade Mall. 
In addition to its purpose as a gathering location, Cascade Mall had several 
indicators of vulnerability: abandoned storefronts, low population, and 
high crime statistics in the immediate area.152 As explained through the 
broken windows theory, the appearance of disorder leads to increased fear 
and withdrawal from residents, which then allows more serious crime to 
move in because of decreased levels of informal social control and 
increased vulnerability of those locations as a target. Sadly, in this case, at 
least one man did take advantage of Cascade Mall’s vulnerability. Using 
the broken windows theory as a means to interpret character of the 
business as a factor in determining the duty to protect in Washington 
would be an expansive move. But it would be a move that affords an 
opportunity to combat situations like Cascade Mall—and hopefully 
prevent further violence, particularly mass gun violence, from occurring 
again. 
CONCLUSION 
Washington State has the opportunity to clarify and expand the 
definition of character of the business in an unfortunate climate where 
mass violence and third-party criminal acts are increasing in prevalence. 
Washington’s current prior incidents liability analysis does not fully 
address public policy concerns of safety. Moreover, narrow enhancements 
in Washington’s prior incidents test indicate a conservative turn that all 
but curtails a determination of foreseeability in a case of third-party 
criminal acts. These restrictions limit the liability of businesses for failing 
to protect their patrons and leave injured plaintiffs uncompensated for 
harms sustained. 
This Comment provides an overview of the various state analyses for 
determining liability for third-party criminal conduct and specifically 
breaks down how states have incorporated the concept of character of the 
business as a factor in liability analysis. The criminological theory of 
broken windows introduced how the appearance of disorder could lead to 
further crime. Combined with case law across the jurisdictions, the broken 
windows perspective provides a sociological basis for expanding the 
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definition of character of the business to include circumstances 
surrounding the nature and condition of the business. 
The time has come for an expansive standard to be established. Such 
a standard would not single out business owners by imposing an 
absolute duty upon them to perform society’s work but at the same time 
would not allow business owners with clearly inadequate security to 
escape responsibility. Adoption of a standard that incorporates a 
sociological understanding of the effects of an atmosphere of crime, such 
as the one proposed through the inclusion of the character of the business 
factor, is a feasible solution towards the difficult balancing of victims’ 
compensation and protection of business owners. By embracing a more 
expansive definition, Washington would increase its ability to stave off 
future instances of third-party criminal conduct. Furthermore, promoting 
safe practices of community monitoring and maintenance in order to 
prevent businesses from becoming increasingly vulnerable and susceptible 
to attack would serve as a strong indication that Washington cares for its 
citizens and wants to keep them safe. 
 
